Abstract
This commentary demonstrates that Avner Greif, through his citation practices, has denied Janet Landa her full intellectual property rights with respect to her contributions to the economic analysis of trust and identity. He has done so by systematically failing to cite her published papers in this field, incidentally promoting his own publications as meriting priority. In consequence, he has effectively blocked out Janet Landa’s work from the mainstream economics literature, albeit not from the literature of law and economics, where his own writings have not been directed.
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Rowley, C.K. The curious citation practices of Avner Greif: Janet Landa comes to grief. Public Choice 140, 275–285 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9442-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9442-y