Abstract
We consider a two-stage model of a Tullock rent-seeking contest where one new potential entrant makes his appearance. In the first stage each other player can contribute to bribe this new player to commit not to enter the contest. In the second stage we have the actual contest either with or without the new player. We present the conditions such that there exist equilibria in which the new player is being bribed.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Schoonbeek, L. Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest. Public Choice 139, 153–158 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9385-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9385-8