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An econometric analysis of counterterrorism effectiveness: the impact on life and property losses

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Abstract

This paper investigates authorities’ relative counterterrorism effectiveness focusing on its behavior over time, its impact on casualties and property losses. Using data on transnational terrorism from the ITERATE database (1973–2003) and discrete choice models, relative counterterrorism effectiveness is evaluated controlling for a variety of terrorists’ and authorities’ effort attributes. The probability of a terrorist incident being stopped by the authorities has increased in the examined period. Furthermore, a negative relationship between authorities’ ability to stop an incident and the probabilities of casualties and damages is identified. However, the “ability to stop” exerts higher impact on the probability of property losses compared to casualties.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Patras, Rio University Campus, 26504, Patras, Greece

    Konstantinos Drakos & Nicholas Giannakopoulos

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  1. Konstantinos Drakos
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  2. Nicholas Giannakopoulos
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Correspondence to Konstantinos Drakos.

Additional information

K. Drakos is core member of the Network for the Economic Analysis of Terrorism (NEAT), URL: http://www.economics-of-security.eu/neat/.

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Drakos, K., Giannakopoulos, N. An econometric analysis of counterterrorism effectiveness: the impact on life and property losses. Public Choice 139, 135–151 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9384-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9384-9

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