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A welfare simulation of mixed-member electoral systems

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Abstract

This paper considers welfare properties of mixed-member electoral systems. In a mixed system, voters may elect high-quality district representatives without excessive campaign fundraising. Simulation results reveal that the optimally mixed electoral system can be welfare-enhancing, but a poorly targeted electoral reform can do worse than a PR system or plurality rule.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14853, USA

    Jin-Hyuk Kim

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  1. Jin-Hyuk Kim
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Correspondence to Jin-Hyuk Kim.

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Kim, JH. A welfare simulation of mixed-member electoral systems. Public Choice 136, 447–456 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9305-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9305-y

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