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Bequests, sibling rivalry, and rent seeking

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Abstract

We examine bequest-sharing rules where sibling rivalry creates wasteful competition for intergenerational transfers. We show that equal division of bequests minimizes rent-seeking expenditures by siblings while primogeniture maximizes rent-seeking costs. Our results lend theoretical support to the empirical findings of equal bequests without appeal to complex models of the parent-child relationship.

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Correspondence to Brian L. Goff.

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Faith, R.L., Goff, B.L. & Tollison, R.D. Bequests, sibling rivalry, and rent seeking. Public Choice 136, 397–409 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9302-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9302-1

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