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Auctions or grandfathering: the political economy of tradable emission permits

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Abstract

Despite the prevalence of grandfathered permits, we still observe that a hybrid policy, in which a fraction of initial emission permits is distributed through auctions, is adopted in some cases. We also observe that some polluting industries support auctioned permits, and that most environmental groups support grandfathered permits. This paper attempts to explain these phenomena from the perspective of political economy, and investigates the conditions under which grandfathering, auctions, or a hybrid instrument will be the equilibrium policy. By constructing a two-stage lobbying game, in which the type of policy instrument (auction, grandfathering, or a hybrid instrument) is determined in the first stage, and then the number of permits is decided in the second stage, we highlight the strategic interaction of the lobbying activities between the two stages in explaining the behavior of the lobbying groups.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Public Finance, National Chengchi University, No. 64, Sec. 2, ZhiNan Rd., Taipei, 11605, Taiwan, ROC

    Yu-Bong Lai

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  1. Yu-Bong Lai
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Correspondence to Yu-Bong Lai.

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The author is grateful to the Editor in Chief, W.F. Shughart II, the Associate Editor, Michael Munger, the referee, and Arun Malik for the useful comments and suggestions, and to Professor James T. Hamilton for the help. The remaining errors are the author’s sole responsibility. Financial support from the National Science Council [Grant NSC 93-2415-H-305-008] is gratefully acknowledged.

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Lai, YB. Auctions or grandfathering: the political economy of tradable emission permits. Public Choice 136, 181–200 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9290-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9290-1

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