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Colluding victims: A public choice analysis of international alliances

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Abstract

Analysis of international alliances is often premised on predicted responses by nation states when nation states are assumed to behave as utility-maximising actors. ‘Large’ allies are exploited by ‘small’ allies when output is a public good. Empirical analysis of defence expenditures in NATO yields results consistent with the proposition that ‘exploitation’ increases as alliance output approximates a pure public good. But why would large countries acquiesce? A public choice analysis offers a different perspective. If producers of armaments are rent seeking, are large allies able to capture rent by incurring a disproportionate share of defence expenditure?

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath, BA7 2AY, UK

    Philip Jones

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  1. Philip Jones
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Correspondence to Philip Jones.

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JEL Classifications: H410, H560, H870

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Jones, P. Colluding victims: A public choice analysis of international alliances. Public Choice 132, 319–332 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9154-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9154-0

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