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Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest

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Abstract

We consider delegation in a rent-seeking contest with two players, where delegates have more instruments at their disposal than the main players. We endogenize both the decision to hire a delegate and the contingent fee offered to the delegates. We characterize the situations when either no, one or two players hire a delegate in equilibrium. We show that the decision to hire a delegate depends in a non-monotonic way on the size of the contested prize.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Groningen, P.O. Box 800, 9700, AV, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Lambert Schoonbeek

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  1. Lambert Schoonbeek
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Correspondence to Lambert Schoonbeek.

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JEL classification code: D72

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Schoonbeek, L. Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest. Public Choice 131, 453–464 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9125-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9125-x

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