Abstract
Natural resources and aid give dictators revenue to maintain power. Attempts are being made, therefore, to funnel these resources away from nondemocratic governments and toward their citizens. Using formal analysis and building on existing theories of democratization, I analyze the effects of such institutional solutions when they function perfectly (the best-case scenario). The models show that even with institutional safeguards, these resources diminish chances for democratization. In addition to their practical importance, the results have an important theoretical implication: the political resource curse may not be due to dictators' use of these resources, but simply to their existence in nondemocracies.
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Morrison, K.M. Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case scenario. Public Choice 131, 365–386 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9121-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9121-1