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Political economy of the U.S. temporary duty suspension program: An empirical note

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Abstract

We examine every TDS Bill introduced by the House of Representatives and approved by the U.S. International Trade Commission in the last six years. The significant relationship between these bills and campaign contributions coupled with the personal characteristics of proponents and sponsors influence the policy outcomes of the U.S. TDS Program.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, 400 South Orange Avenue, South Orange, NJ, 07079, USA

    Omer Gokcekus & Amber Barth

Authors
  1. Omer Gokcekus
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  2. Amber Barth
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Correspondence to Omer Gokcekus.

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Gokcekus, O., Barth, A. Political economy of the U.S. temporary duty suspension program: An empirical note. Public Choice 131, 345–350 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9119-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9119-8

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