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Esteem-based contributions and optimality in public goods supply

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Abstract

In a paper published in this journal, Cowen (2002) argues that whenever compliance with norms is supported by the forces of esteem, there is “too little” norm compliance. In this paper, we show that Cowen’s logic is flawed – that when the operation of esteem-based norms is formally modelled, no such general a priori conclusion follows. We investigate the conditions that would be necessary to ensure that esteem incentives for public goods contributions generate optimality in public goods supply, and indicate on that basis the conditions for voluntary sub-optimal and supra-optimal public goods provision in the esteem context.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Social and Political Theory Group, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

    Geoffrey Brennan

  2. Politics Department, Duke University, Duke, NC, USA

    Geoffrey Brennan

  3. Philosophy Department, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA

    Geoffrey Brennan

  4. School of Economics and Finance, University of Tasmania, Private Bag 85, Hobart, Tasmania, 7001, Australia

    Michael Brooks

Authors
  1. Geoffrey Brennan
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  2. Michael Brooks
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Correspondence to Michael Brooks.

Additional information

JEL Classification Welfare Theory – General (0240), Publicly provided goods, General (H400), Cultural economics, Social norms and social capital, Economic anthropology (Z130)

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Brennan, G., Brooks, M. Esteem-based contributions and optimality in public goods supply. Public Choice 130, 457–470 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9098-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9098-9

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