Abstract
Pecorino (1998) models tariff lobbying in a repeated game and finds that cooperation can be maintained in a large group, even though tariff lobbying provides a rival public good to interest group members. We add small fixed costs of participation to this model and find that cooperation must break down in large groups. By contrast, if a fully rival public good directly enters the utility function, then cooperation is possible in large groups, even with small participation costs. Thus, we find only partial support for Olson’s (1965) proposition that collective action must break down in large groups.
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JEL Codes: D7, H4, C72
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Pecorino, P., Temimi, A. Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation. Public Choice 130, 337–346 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9090-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9090-4