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Public Choice

, Volume 130, Issue 3–4, pp 329–335 | Cite as

Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment

  • Johannes Münster
Original Article

Abstract

In an interesting recent paper, Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) extended Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game with an entry decision. The mixed strategies identified by Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi for the case of increasing returns in the contest success function (r2) do not constitute an equilibrium of the game they study. However, these strategies are an equilibrium if the strategy space of the game is restricted by a minimum expenditure requirement, and this minimum expenditure requirement is an element of a specific interval.

Keywords

Rent-seeking Contest 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Free University of Berlin and Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)BerlinGermany

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