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Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player

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Abstract

We consider an extension of Tullock's (1980) N-player contest under which prize valuations may vary across players. We show that the pure-strategy equilibrium of this contest is unique. We also establish the following results: rent dissipation increases, individual winning probabilities decrease, and individual spending either increases or decreases with the addition of a player.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, 15260, USA

    Alexander Matros

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  1. Alexander Matros
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Correspondence to Alexander Matros.

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Matros, A. Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player. Public Choice 129, 369–380 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9037-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9037-9

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