Advertisement

Public Choice

, Volume 126, Issue 3–4, pp 343–355 | Cite as

Selecting Committees

  • Thomas C. Ratliff
Article

Abstract

In selecting a committee, voters are often concerned with the over all composition of the committee rather than simply selecting a single individual as their representative. We give two examples of elections at Wheaton College in Massachusetts that illustrate the complexity of preferences that voters may have for the relationships among the individual candidates. These preferences cannot be separated into preferences on the individual candidates and are not detectable from only a voter's top-ranked committee. We outline the questions this raises for the design of committee elections in general and propose directions for future work.

Keywords

Public Finance Single Individual Individual Candidate Committee Election Wheaton College 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Bock, H. E., Day, W. H. E., & McMorris, F. R. (1998). Consensus rule for committee elections. Mathematical Social Sciences, 35(3), 219–232.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Brams, S. J., Kilgour, D. M., & Sanver, M. R. (2004). A minimax procedure for electing committees. Preprint.Google Scholar
  3. Chamberlin, J. R., & Courant, P. N. (1977). Representative deliberations and representative decisions: Proportional representation and the borda rule. The American Political Science Review, 77(3), 718–733.Google Scholar
  4. Fishburn, P. C. (1981). An analysis of simple voting systems for electing committees. SIAM Jorunal on Applied Mathematics, 41(3), 499–502.Google Scholar
  5. Gehrlein, W. V. (1985). The condorcet criterion and committee selection. Mathematical Social Sciences, 10(3), 199–209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Kaymak, B., & Sanver, M. (2003). Sets of alternatives as condorcet winners. Social Choice and Welfare, 20(3), 477–494.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Ratliff, T. (2003). Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees. Social Choice and Welfare, 21(3), 433–454.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Saari, D. G. (2001). Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  9. Saari, D. G. (2004). Analyzing pairwise voting rules. In M. Wiberg (Ed.), Reasoned Choices, Finnish Political Science Association, 318–342.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Mathematics and Computer ScienceWheaton CollegeNorton

Personalised recommendations