Using data from the Swedish Election Studies between 1985 and 1994 supplemented with time series on inflation and unemployment, I compare the impact of macro- and microeconomic variables on the individual vote. The principal finding is that macroeconomic variables influence the vote a bit more than microeconomic variables do. In consequence, both self-interest and public interest appear to be important explanations of economic voting in Sweden. Macroeconomic variables have, however, been much more influential in determining election outcomes. Since previous studies of economic voting have used cross-sectional data only, it is also worth noting that panel estimates indicate a much greater impact of macroeconomic variables on the individual vote than cross-sectional estimates do.
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An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9893-9
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Jordahl, H. An economic analysis of voting in Sweden. Public Choice 127, 251–265 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-0864-5
- Panel Data
- Public Choice
- Macroeconomic Variable
- Left Wing
- Individual Vote