Abstract
This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between office-holder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the office-holder’s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to learn, i.e., raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive “re-election concerns” effect of elections on effort, implying higher effort with appointment. When this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections.
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Borgne, E.L., Lockwood, B. Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning vs. Re-Election Concerns. Public Choice 129, 41–60 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-0863-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-0863-6