Public Choice

, Volume 126, Issue 1–2, pp 225–256 | Cite as

Empirical determinants of corruption: A sensitivity analysis

  • Danila SerraEmail author


Many variables have been proposed by past studies as significant determinants of corruption. This paper asks if their estimated impact on corruption is robust to alteration of the information set. A “Global Sensitivity Analysis”, based on the Leamer's Extreme-Bounds Analysis gives a clear answer: five variables are robustly related to corruption. Corruption is lower in richer countries, where democratic institutions have been preserved for a long continuous period, and the population is mainly Protestant. Corruption is instead higher where political instability is a major problem. Finally, a country's colonial heritage appears to be a significant determinant of present corruption.


Sensitivity Analysis Public Finance Past Study Significant Determinant Rich Country 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CSAE, Department of EconomicsUniversity of OxfordU.K.

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