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The eclipse of legislatures: Direct democracy in the 21st century

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Abstract

Demographic, political, and technological trends are fueling an unprecedented growth in direct democracy worldwide. If the trends continue, direct democracy threatens to eclipse legislatures in setting the policy agenda. This article reviews existing scientific knowledge about the initiative and referendum – the main institutions of direct democracy – and highlights key issues for the future.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Marshall School of Business and Law School, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, 90089-1427, USA

    John G. Matsusaka

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  1. John G. Matsusaka
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Correspondence to John G. Matsusaka.

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Matsusaka, J.G. The eclipse of legislatures: Direct democracy in the 21st century. Public Choice 124, 157–177 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-4760-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-4760-1

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