Abstract
Voting procedures nowadays are anachronistic on two counts: the technology of recording and counting votes often is outmoded and too much is expected from the mechanisms of democratic choice. Even if votes always and everywhere were counted perfectly, election outcomes would still be arbitrary since no collective choice process can divine the “general will”. The crucial line in any state is the one dividing private decisions from collective decisions. Democracy is part of the package for nations freeing themselves from totalitarianism’s grip, but it may be the last, rather than the first thing that should be added to the mix.
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Munger, M.C. Nineteenth-century voting procedures in a twenty-first century world. Public Choice 124, 115–133 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-4749-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-4749-9