Abstract
This special issue of Public Choice was designed to afford leading scholars the opportunity to summarize the current state of the public choice literature in key areas of public policy concern and to offer their thoughts about future directions of research. By laying out public choice frameworks for analyzing some of the major challenges confronting democratic governments at the dawn of the 21st century, the issue’s overarching goal is to demonstrate the vibrancy and continuing relevance of the public choice research program.
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Shughart, W.F., Tollison, R.D. Public choice in the new century. Public Choice 124, 1–18 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-4740-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-4740-5