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The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock

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References

Selected references: Gordon Tullock.

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  1. Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, 22030, U.S.A.

    Roger D. Congleton

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  1. Roger D. Congleton
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Congleton, R.D. The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock. Public Choice 121, 213–238 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-004-9785-3

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