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Caplan, B. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work . Public Choice 121, 260–262 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-004-0810-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-004-0810-3