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Contracting and Performance in Agencies: A Question of Control, Dialogue or Autonomy?

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Abstract

The article investigates whether contracting process affects goal attainment in internal contracts. Based on literature on contracting and performance management, we deduce four hypotheses concerning contracting processes and goal attainment. The hypotheses are tested by studying contracts from all Danish agencies together with a survey and interviews with the heads of agencies. We find that dialogue and some autonomy in the contracting process increase goal attainment if balanced with hierarchical control. We also find that agreement between agencies and departments on performance demands and assessment criteria positively affect goal attainment.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. KORA, Danish Institute for Local and Regional Government Research, Aarhus, Denmark

    Bente Bjørnholt

  2. Department of Political Science, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark

    Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen

Authors
  1. Bente Bjørnholt
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  2. Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Bente Bjørnholt.

Appendix

Appendix

A: The department uses contracting as a means to increase the control over the agency

   

B: The department uses contracting as a means to stimulate dialogue

1

2

3

4

5

Case 1:

Case 3:

Case 6:

Case 10:

Case 21:

-Positive towards contracting

Creates mutual expectations

Long-term perspective Control OK

-Department

Mutual and equal interest

-Autonomy? (5a)b

-Management approach: Strategic

- Responsive towards contracting:

Creates mutual expectations

-Department:

Formal relation to the department

-absence of (continuous dialogue)

No interest from the department

-Autonomy:

Not influenced by contracting (3)

-Management approach: Responsive

-Positive towards contracting

-Department:

Absence of continuous dialogue – but OK given the de-politicized character of the agency’s port folio

-Autonomy:

Creates autonomy (4)

-Management approach: Responsive

-Positive towards contracting:

Clarifies goals

Mutual understanding

But also…some inflexibility and hard to use in personnel management

-Department:

Mutual and equal interest

-Autonomy:

Creates autonomy (5)

-Management approach:

Strategic

-Positive towards contracting:

Creates mutual expectations

-Department:

Continuous, informal dialogue in general

-Autonomy:

Creates autonomy (5)

-Management approach:

Responsive

Case 2:

Case 4:

Case 7:

Case 11:

Case 22:

-Negative towards contracting

-Department: Unclear of the role of the department – absence of (continuous) dialogue

No interest from the department

-Autonomy:

Reduces autonomy in relation to the department (5)

-Management approach:

Indifferent

- Positive (pragmatic) towards contracting:

Creates mutual understanding

-Department:

Mutual and equal interest

-Autonomy? (1)

Creates some autonomy

-Management approach: Strategic/responsive

- Positive (pragmatic) towards contracting:

Creates mutual expectations

-Department:

Mutual and equal pragmatic approach

Continuous, informal dialogue in general

-Autonomy:

Creates Autonomy (3)

-Management approach: Responsive

-Negative towards contracting:

Performance subject to politicization

Add to complexity in number of management tools

Distorts the priorities of the agency’s portfolio

Creates bureaucracy and (administratively) time consuming

-Department:

Interest from the department (given the politicized area) creates more dialogue

-Autonomy:

Creates some autonomy (4)

-Management approach: Strategic

-Positive towards contracting:

Creates mutual expectations

Creates focus

Creates transparency

-Department: Continuous, informal dialogue in general

-Autonomy:

Creates more autonomy (3)

-Management approach: Strategic

 

Case 5:

Case 8:

Case 12:

Case 23:

 

-Positive towards contracting:

Creates mutual expectations

-Department:

Interest from the department

-Autonomy: Increases Autonomy (4)

-Management approach: Responsive

-Positive (pragmatic) towards contracting:

Creates mutual expectations

-Department:

Mutual and equal pragmatic approach

Continuous, informal dialogue in general

-Autonomy? (3)

Management approach: Responsive

-Positive (pragmatic) towards contracting

-Department: Mutual and equal interest

-Autonomy:

Creates autonomy (4)

-Management approach: Strategic

-Positive towards contracting

-Department: Mutual and equal interest

Autonomy:

Creates autonomy (5)

-Management approach: Strategic

  

Case 9:

Negative towards contracting

Just one among many management tools

-Department: Symbolic

Mutual and equal disinterest

-Autonomy: (3)

Indifferent

-Management approach:

Responsive

Case 13:

−Positive towards contracting:

Creates mutual understanding

-Department:

Mutual and equal interest

Creates open and constructive dialogue

-Autonomy: Creates autonomy (5)

-Management approach: Strategic

 
   

Case 14:

 
   

- Positive (pragmatic) towards contracting:

Creates mutual expectations

-Department:

Mutual and equal interest

-Autonomy:

Creates autonomy (3)

Management approach: Strategic – tries to counterbalance the downside of contracting

 
   

Case 15:

 
   

-Positive towards contracting:

Legitimizes the existence of the agency

-Department:

Mutual and equal interest Creates open and constructive dialogue

-Autonomy:

Creates autonomy (3)

-Management approach: Strategic

 
   

Case 16:

−Positive towards contracting:

Creates mutual understanding

Creates dialogue – But is also somewhat inflexible

-Department:

Mutual and equal interest

-Autonomy:

Creates autonomy (5)

-Management approach: Strategic

 
   

Case 17: Positive towards contracting:

Creates mutual agreement

Creates autonomy

-Department:

Mutual and equal interest

Continuous, informal dialogue in general

-Autonomy:

Creates autonomy from department and the minister (5)

-Management approach: Strategic

 
   

Case 18:

Indifferent towards contracting but contracting structures the agency’s activities.

-Department

Mutual and equal interest

Department focuses on specific individual targets

-Autonomy: (4) Creates autonomy

-Management approach:

Responsive strategic

 
   

Case 19:

Positive towards contracting since it structures the agency’s activities

-Department

Mutual and equal interest and dialog

-Autonomy: (4)

Autonomy because of effect focus

-Management

approach:Strategic

 
   

Case 20:

Positive towards contracting: Creates mutual understanding and transparency

-Department

Mutual and equal interest

Continuous, informal dialogue in general

-Autonomy: (3) Creates autonomy from department but mutual goal setting

-Management approach:

Strategic

 
  1. aThe numbers in parentheses refer to the answers given on agency heads’ perceptions of autonomy in contracting, where 1 refers to agency heads who find that contracting reduces their autonomy in relation to the department and 5 refers to agency heads finding that contracting strengthens their autonomy with respect to the agency.
  2. b? means that this code is not identifiable in the interviews.

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Bjørnholt, B., Salomonsen, H.H. Contracting and Performance in Agencies: A Question of Control, Dialogue or Autonomy?. Public Organiz Rev 15, 509–530 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-014-0286-7

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