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The contributions of philosophy: reply to critics of the world philosophy made

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Notes

  1. Thanks to Dominik Kobos for this observation.

  2. This story is a consequence of the account of cognitive propositions briefly addressed on pp. 146–150 of chapter 7 of The World Philosophy Made, and developed in more detail in chapters 4 and 5 of Soames (2015).

  3. Page 181, of Soames (2018b).

  4. See Soames (2013) at pp. 613–617, and Soames (2020) at 253–258.

  5. See the Introduction to Soames (2003a).

  6. Preface to Soames (2014) and section 1 of chapter 1 of Soames (2018a).

  7. See Soames (2018a) and chapters 1–9 of Soames (2003b).

  8. Preston speaks of the ultimate aim of western philosophy as persisting from Plato until the early twentieth century when it was rejected by analytic philosophers who “quietly abandoned [it] in the face of society’s demand for more scientifically trained specialists.” He characterizes me as seeing philosophers as, “first and foremost, conceptual technicians.” This is nonsense. Frege, Russell, Carnap, Schlick and Godel weren’t conceptual technicians, but penetrating philosophers who sought to plumb the depths and limits of logic, mathematics, and science, and, in Schlick’s case, even ethics. Although Wittgenstein started out as an aeronautical engineer, after turning to philosophy he was no conceptual technician.

  9. Havlock (1967).

  10. See Havlock (1983), especially pp. 29, 40–41, for discussion of the transition from Anaxagoras (500–428 BCE) to Plato and Aristotle on motion and related concepts.

  11. See pp. 82–86 of Soames (1999) and pp. 121–125 of The World Philosophy Made.

  12. Quoted from Burton’s English notes to Euthyphro 5 d 3. Concerning this work, Myles Burnyeat says that “it is “the still unsurpassed edition” of the three dialogs.

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to my colleague, Kevin Robb, for a discussion of these matters.

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Soames, S. The contributions of philosophy: reply to critics of the world philosophy made. Philos Stud 179, 2119–2132 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01754-6

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