Abstract
Machery’s book is an effort to show how experimental philosophy can be valuable without the perephenelia of intuitions. I argue that the effort fails.
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Notes
Machery calls it ‘Method of Cases 2.0’.
If this went by a bit fast, see Part II of Cappelen 2018 for elaboration.
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to Derek Ball, Josh Dever, Edouard Machery for useful discussions, and to Matt Mckeever for detailed comments and suggestions.
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Cappelen, H. Experimental philosophy without intuitions: an illustration of why it fails. Philos Stud 179, 309–317 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01581-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01581-1