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Moral responsibility and manipulation: on a novel argument against historicism

  • Alfred R. MeleEmail author
Article

Abstract

Taylor Cyr offers a novel argument against, as he puts it, “all versions of historicism” about direct moral responsibility (Philos Stud.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01315-y, 2019). The argument features constitutive luck and a comparison of manipulated agents and young agents performing the first actions for which they are morally responsible. Here it is argued that Cyr’s argument misses its mark. Alfred Mele’s historicism is highlighted.

Keywords

Luck Manipulation Mele Moral responsibility Young agents 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

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