Moral responsibility and manipulation: on a novel argument against historicism
Taylor Cyr offers a novel argument against, as he puts it, “all versions of historicism” about direct moral responsibility (Philos Stud. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01315-y, 2019). The argument features constitutive luck and a comparison of manipulated agents and young agents performing the first actions for which they are morally responsible. Here it is argued that Cyr’s argument misses its mark. Alfred Mele’s historicism is highlighted.
KeywordsLuck Manipulation Mele Moral responsibility Young agents
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