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An objection of varying importance to epistemic utility theory

  • Benjamin A. Levinstein
Article

Abstract

Some propositions are more epistemically important than others. Further, how important a proposition is is often a contingent matter—some propositions count more in some worlds than in others. Epistemic Utility Theory cannot accommodate this fact, at least not in any standard way. For EUT to be successful, legitimate measures of epistemic utility must be proper, i.e., every probability function must assign itself maximum expected utility. Once we vary the importance of propositions across worlds, however, normal measures of epistemic utility become improper. I argue there isn’t any good way out for EUT.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUrbanaUSA

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