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We cannot infer by accepting testimony

  • Ulf Hlobil
Article
  • 70 Downloads

Abstract

While we can judge and believe things by merely accepting testimony, we cannot make inferences by merely accepting testimony. A good theory of inference should explain this. The theories that are best suited to explain this fact seem to be theories that accept a so-called intuitional construal of Boghossian’s Taking Condition.

Keywords

Inference Taking condition Testimony Belief Intuition 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful for invaluable comments on earlier drafts that I received from John McDowell, Ori Beck, Katharina Nieswandt, Robert Brandom, James Shaw, Karl Schafer, and an anonymous referee.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyConcordia UniversityMontrealCanada
  2. 2.University of Hradec KrálovéHradec KrálovéCzechia

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