Abstract
In this essay, I provide responses to the trenchant critical remarks of Michael McKenna, Matt Talbert, and Gary Watson on my book Responsibility from the Margins. In doing so, I provide some new thoughts on the nature of attributability, what work talk of "capacities" is doing in my tripartite, qualities of will theory of responsibility, and what the relation is between our attitudes and practices of holding others and ourselves responsible.
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Shoemaker, D. Responses to Watson, Talbert, and McKenna. Philos Stud 175, 999–1010 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1045-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1045-3