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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 6, pp 1495–1512 | Cite as

Reply to Fine on Aboutness

  • Stephen Yablo
Article
  • 358 Downloads

Abstract

A reply to Fine’s critique of Aboutness. Fine contrasts two notions of truthmaker, and more generally two notions of “state.” One is algebraic; states are sui generis entities grasped primarily through the conditions they satisfy. The other uses set theory; states are sets of worlds, or, perhaps, collections of such sets. I try to defend the second notion and question some seeming advantages of the first.

Keywords

Meaning Truth Metaphysics Intentionality Propositions 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the participants in a workshop on the book held in the Summer of 2015 at the University of Hamburg—especially Ken Gemes, Mark Jago, Daniel Rothschild, Katharina Felka, Stephan Kraemer, Benjamin Schnieder, Robert Schwartzkopff, and Kit Fine. Enormous additional thanks to Kit for his hospitality to a sometimes straggling fellow traveler.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Linguistics and PhilosophyMITCambridgeUSA

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