Defending constituent ontology
Constituent ontologies maintain that the properties of an object are either parts or something very much like parts of that object. Recently, such a view has been criticized as (i) leading to a bizarre and problematic form of substance dualism and (ii) implying the existence of impossible objects. After briefly presenting constituent and relational ontologies, I respond to both objections, arguing that constituent ontology does not yield either of these two consequences and so is not shown to be an unacceptable ontological framework.
KeywordsConstituent ontology Parthood Composition
Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments. Thanks also to Stephen T. Davis for helpful discussion on some of these issues.
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