The non-remedial value of dependence on moral testimony
In this paper I defend dependence on moral testimony. I show how going defenses of dependence on moral testimony have portrayed it as second-best by centering on how and why it is an important means to overcoming our defects. I argue that once we consider the pervasiveness of moral testimony in the context of intimate relationships, we can see that the value of dependence on moral testimony goes beyond this: it is not only our flaws and limitations that justify our dependence on moral testimony, but also the importance of such dependence for the flourishing of our intimate relationships. On my view, dependence on moral testimony is not simply for those who cannot realize the ideals of moral agency; it is among those ideals.
KeywordsMoral testimony Moral deference Dependence Trust
I would like to thank several people for helpful feedback on this article. Special thanks to: an anonymous referee of this journal; Lara Buchak; Nick Casalbore; Cassie Herbert; Anne Langhorne; Maggie Little; Ryan Preston-Roedder; Karen Stohr; and most especially, Mark Murphy.
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