Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 3, pp 601–627 | Cite as

Does hallucinating involve perceiving?

Article

Abstract

A natural starting point for theories of perceptual states is ordinary perception, in which a subject is successfully related to her mind-independent surroundings. Correspondingly, the simplest theory of perceptual states models all such states on perception. Typically, this simple, common-factor relational view of perceptual states has received a perfunctory dismissal on the grounds that hallucinations are nonperceptual. But I argue that the nonperceptual view of hallucinations has been accepted too quickly. I consider three observations thought to support the view, and argue that all three are dealt with equally well by an alternative view, illusionism, on which hallucinations do involve perception. Since this is so, adopting a common-factor relational view of all perceptual states remains a tenable option.

Keywords

Hallucinations Perception Misperception Illusionism Relationalism Naïve realism Common-factor Philosophy of perception Philosophy of mind 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of HumanitiesLebanese American UniversityChouran, BeirutLebanon

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