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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 11, pp 2731–2742 | Cite as

Access Problems and explanatory overkill

Article

Abstract

I argue that recent attempts to deflect Access Problems for realism about a priori domains such as mathematics, logic, morality, and modality using arguments from evolution result in two kinds of explanatory overkill: (1) the Access Problem is eliminated for contentious domains, and (2) realist belief becomes viciously immune to arguments from dispensability, and to non-rebutting counter-arguments more generally.

Keywords

Access Problem Reliability challenge Evolutionary debunking arguments Moral realism Mathematical platonism Modal realism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Van Leer InstituteJerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Hebrew University of JerusalemJerusalemIsrael

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