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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 5, pp 1163–1190 | Cite as

Aggregating extended preferences

  • Hilary Greaves
  • Harvey Lederman
Article

Abstract

An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi (J Political Econ 61(5):434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people’s so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow’s celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend that she pursue one: developing aggregation rules (for extended preferences) that violate Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition.

Keywords

Interpersonal well-being comparisons Extended preferences Preference-satisfaction theory  Theories of well-being 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We thank Christian List, Teruji Thomas and John Weymark for useful discussions and correspondence.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of OxfordOxfordUK
  2. 2.University of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

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