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Responses

Abstract

This is a response to the comments of Boghossian (Philos Stud, 2016. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0716-1), Cullity (Philos Stud, 2016. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0717-0), Pettit (Philos Stud, 2016. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0718-z) and Southwood (Philos Stud, 2016. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0719-y) on my book Rationality Through Reasoning (Broome in Rationality through reasoning. Wiley, Chichester, 2013).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the difference between necessary and essential conditions, see Fine (1994).

  2. 2.

    Kripke (1982). The problems are distinguished by Paul Boghossian (2016, 2014, Sect. 10).

References

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Acknowledgments

My research for this paper was supported by the Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery Grant Number DP140102468.

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Correspondence to John Broome.

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Broome, J. Responses. Philos Stud 173, 3431–3448 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0721-4

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Keywords

  • Rule-following
  • Linking belief
  • Rationality
  • Reasoning
  • Motivation