Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 4, pp 853–859

Metaphors and Martinis: a response to Jessica Keiser


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-016-0709-0

Cite this article as:
Stokke, A. Philos Stud (2017) 174: 853. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0709-0


This note responds to criticism put forth by Jessica Keiser against a theory of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Keiser objects that this view wrongly counts particular kinds of non-literal speech as instances of lying. In particular, Keiser argues that the view invariably counts metaphors and certain uses of definite descriptions as lies. It is argued here that both these claims are false.


Lying Metaphors Definite descriptions Common ground Assertion 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious StudiesUmeå UniversityUmeåSweden

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