Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 2, pp 291–310 | Cite as

On fraud

  • Liam Kofi BrightEmail author


Preferably scientific investigations would promote true rather than false beliefs. The phenomenon of fraud represents a standing challenge to this veritistic ideal. When scientists publish fraudulent results they knowingly enter falsehoods into the information stream of science. Recognition of this challenge has prompted calls for scientists to more consciously adopt the veritistic ideal in their own work. In this paper I argue against such promotion of the veritistic ideal. It turns out that a sincere desire on the part of scientists to see the truth propagated may well promote more fraud rather than less.


Philosophy of science Social epistemology Decision theory Fraud Social structure of science Veritism 



Thanks for helpful comments to Kevin Zollman, Carole Lee, Remco Heesen, Konstantin Genin, Jennifer Saul, Yuzuko Nakamura, Daniel Malinsky, Danielle Wenner, and anonymous reviewers for the Formal Epistemology Workshop and Philosophical Studies.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBaker Hall 161, Carnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburghUSA

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