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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 9, pp 2533–2549 | Cite as

Soames’s new conception of propositions

  • Ben CaplanEmail author
Article

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that, when it comes to explaining what can be described as “representational” properties of propositions, Soames’s new conception of propositions—on which the proposition that Seattle is sunny is the act of predicating the property being sunny of Seattle and to entertain that proposition is to perform that act—does not have an advantage over traditional ones.

Keywords

Soames Proposition Representation Grounding Essence Explanation 

Notes

Acknowledgments

For comments and discussion, the author offers thanks to participants at a talk at the Eastern APA in January 2016 and to David Braun, Peter Hanks, Jon Litland, Eileen Nutting, Richard Samuels, Scott Soames, Jeff Speaks, Chris Tillman, and Kelly Trogdon.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyOhio State UniversityColumbusUSA

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