Advertisement

Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 9, pp 2333–2352 | Cite as

Testimony, evidence and interpersonal reasons

  • Nick LeonardEmail author
Article

Abstract

According to the Interpersonal View of Testimony (IVT), testimonial justification is non-evidential in nature. I begin by arguing that the IVT has the following problem: If the IVT is true, then young children and people with autism cannot participate in testimonial exchanges; but young children and people with autism can participate in testimonial exchanges; thus, the IVT should be rejected on the grounds that it has over-cognized what it takes to give and receive testimony. Afterwards, I consider what I take to be the two best motivations for the IVT and argue that they both fail. The overarching lesson, then, is that the IVT is unmotivated and false; we should think of testimonial justification as being evidential in nature.

Keywords

Testimony Evidence Justification Reasons 

References

  1. Baron-Cohen, S. (1989). The autistic child’s theory of mind: A case of specific developmental delay. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 30(2), 285–297.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Baron-Cohen, S. (1993). From attention-goal psychology to belief-desire psychology: The development of a theory of mind, and its dysfunction. In S. Baron-Cohen, et al. (Eds.), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from autism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Bowler, D. M. (1992). Theory of mind’ in Asperger’s syndrome. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 33(5), 877–893.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Clement, F., Koenig, M., & Harris, P. (2004). The ontogenisis of trust. Mind and Language, 19, 360–379.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Coull, G. J., Leekam, S. R., & Bennett, M. (2006). Simplifying second-order belief attribution: What facilitates children’s performance on measures of conceptual understanding? Social Development, 15(2), 260–275.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Douvan, I. (2006). Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility. Philosophical Review, 115, 449–485.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Faulkner, P. (2007). On telling and trusting. Mind, 116, 875–902.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Faulkner, P. (2011). Knowledge on trust. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Fricker, E. (1987). The epistemology of testimony. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Vol. 61, 57–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Frith, U., & Happé, F. (1994). Language and communication in autistic disorders. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series B, 346, 97–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Glüer, K., & Pagin, P. (2003). Meaning theory and autistic speakers. Mind and Language, 18, 23–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Goldberg, S. (2006). Reductionism and the distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge. In J. Lackey & E. Sosa (Eds.), The epistemology of testimony (pp. 127–144). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Goldberg, S. (2008). Testimonial knowledge in early childhood, revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76, 1–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Goldberg, S. (2015). Assertion: On the philosophical significance of assertoric speech. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Graham, P. (2000). Conveying information. Synthese, 123, 365–392.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. The Philosophical Review, 66, 337–388.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Happé, F. (1993). Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: A test of relevance theory. Cognition, 48, 101–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Happé, F. (1995). The role of age and verbal ability in the theory of mind task performance of subjects with autism. Child Development, 66, 843–855.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Hayashi, H. (2007). Young children’s understanding of second-order mental states. Psychologia, 50(1), 15–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Hinchman, E. (2005). Telling as inviting to trust. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70, 562–587.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Hinchman, E. (2014). Assurance and warrant. Philosopher’s Imprint, 17, 1–58.Google Scholar
  22. Keren, A. (2012). On the alleged perversity of the evidential view of testimony. Analysis, 72, 700–707.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Koenig, M., Clement, F., & Harris, P. (2004). Trust in testimony: Children’s use of true and false statements. Psychological Science, 15, 694–698.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Kvanvig, J. (2009). Assertion, knowledge and lotteries. In D. Pritchard & P. Greenough (Eds.), Williamson on knowledge (pp. 140–160). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Lackey, J. (2005). Testimony and the infant/child objection. Philosophical Studies, 126, 163–190.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Lackey, J. (2007). Norms of assertion. Nous, 41, 594–626.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Lackey, J. (2008). Learning from words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Leslie, A., & Roth, D. (1993). What autism teaches us about metarepresentation. In S. Baron-Cohen, et al. (Eds.), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from autism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  29. McMyler, B. (2011). Testimony, trust and authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. McMyler, B. (2013). The epistemic significance of address. Synthese, 190, 1059–1078.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Miller, S. A. (2009). Children’s understanding of second-order mental states. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 749–773.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Miller, S. A. (2012). Theory of mind: Beyond the preschool years. New York, NY: Psychology Press.Google Scholar
  33. Moran, R. (2005). Getting told and being believed. Philosopher’s Imprint, 5, 1–29.Google Scholar
  34. Owens, D. (2006). Testimony and assertion. Philosophical Studies, 130, 105–129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Ozonoff, S., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (1991). Executive function deficits in high-functioning autistic individuals: Relationship to theory of mind. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32, 1081–1105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Parker, J. R., MacDonald, C. A., & Miller, S. A. (2007). “John thinks that Mary feels…” False belief in children across affective and physical domains. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 168, 43–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Pellicano, E. (2007). Links between theory of mind and executive function in young children with autism: Clues to developmental primacy. Developmental Psychology, 43, 974–990.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Perner, J. (1993). The theory of mind deficit in autism: Rethinking the metarepresentation theory. In S. Baron-Cohen, et al. (Eds.), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from autism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  39. Perner, J., & Wimmer, H. (1985). ‘John thinks that Mary thinks that…’ Attribution of second-order beliefs by 4- to 10-year-old children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 39, 437–471.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Pillow, B. H. (1991). Children’s understanding of biased social cognition. Developmental Psychology, 27, 539–551.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Pillow, B. H., & Weed, S. T. (1995). Children’s understanding of biased interpretation: Generality and limitations. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 13, 347–366.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Ross, A. (1986). Why do we believe what we are told? Ratio, 28, 69–88.Google Scholar
  43. Schmitt, F. (2010). The assurance view of testimony. In A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Social epistemology (pp. 216–242). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Shiverick, S. M., & Moore, C. F. (2007). Second-order beliefs about intention and children’s attributions of sociomoral judgment. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 97, 44–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Shultz, T., & Cloghesy, K. (1981). Development of recursive intention. Developmental Psychology, 17, 465–471.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Sosa, E. (1994). Testimony and coherence. In B. K. Matilal & A. Chakrabarti (Eds.), Knowing from words (pp. 59–67). Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Stanley, J. (2008). Knowledge and certainty. Philosophical Issues, 18, 34–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Sullivan, K., Zautchik, D., & Tager-Flusberg, H. (1994). Preschoolers can attribute second-order beliefs. Developmental Psychology, 30, 395–402.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Tager-Flusberg, et al. (1993). An introduction to the debate. In S. Baron-Cohen, et al. (Eds.), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from autism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  50. Williamson, T. (1996). Knowing and asserting. Philosophical Review, 105, 489–523.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. Zagzebski, L. (2012). Epistemic authority: A theory of trust, authority, and autonomy in belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

Personalised recommendations