Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 5, pp 1309–1334 | Cite as

How to accept the transitivity of better than

  • Justin KlocksiemEmail author


Although the thesis that the moral better than relation is transitive seems obviously true, there is a growing literature according to which Parfit’s repugnant conclusion and related puzzles reveal that this thesis is false or problematic. This paper begins by presenting several such puzzles and explaining how they can be used in arguments for the intransitivity of better than. It then proposes and defends a plausible alternative picture of the behavior of better than that both resolves the repugnant conclusion and preserves transitivity. On the threshold-based model of lexicality defended here, hedonic episodes whose intensity is above a certain point are lexically greater (in absolute magnitude) than those whose intensity is below it. The final sections argue that this model is independently plausible and can be defended from several important objections.


Intransitivity Repugnant conclusion Parfit Temkin Rachels 



I am grateful to Rekha Nath, Stuart Rachels, Chase Wrenn, and an anonymous referee for helpful feedback and discussion on earlier drafts of this paper.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AlabamaTuscaloosaUSA

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