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Perceptual evidence and the capacity view

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Abstract

Susanna Schellenberg defends what she calls a "capacity view" concerning perceptual evidence. In this paper, I raise six challenges to Schellenberg's argument.

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Susanna Schellenberg for helpful discussion and comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, CB #3125, Caldwell Hall, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599-3125, USA

    Ram Neta

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  1. Ram Neta
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Correspondence to Ram Neta.

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Neta, R. Perceptual evidence and the capacity view. Philos Stud 173, 907–914 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0530-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0530-1

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