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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 5, pp 1179–1190 | Cite as

Are all reasons causes?

  • Christina H. DietzEmail author
Article

Abstract

In this paper, I revisit the Davidsonian thesis that all reasons are causes. Drawing on a better taxonomy of reasons than the one Davidson provides, I argue that this thesis is either indefensible or uninteresting.

Keywords

Reasons Action Causes Explanation 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Alan Hájek, Claudia Passos, Clayton Littlejohn, David Chalmers, Daniel Stoljar, Juhani Yli-Vakkuri, John Heron, Jake Wojtowicz, Maria Alvarez, Stewart Cohen, and Timothy Williamson for invaluable discussion and feedback. I would also like to thank the School of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Australian National University for hosting my research on this topic. I am especially grateful to John Hawthorne.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of OxfordOxfordUnited Kingdom

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