Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 2, pp 505–523

Willful ignorance and self-deception

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-015-0504-3

Cite this article as:
Lynch, K. Philos Stud (2016) 173: 505. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0504-3

Abstract

Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give no support to the idea that willful ignorance is a kind of self-deception. Afterwards an independent argument is adduced for excluding willful ignorance from this category. The crucial differences between the two phenomena are explored, as are the reasons why they are so easily conflated.

Keywords

Willful ignorance Willful blindness Self-deception Deception Culpable ignorance Ignorance 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Woosong UniversityDaejeonSouth Korea

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