Abstract
This paper evaluates Stalnaker’s recent attempt to outline a realist interpretation of possible worlds semantics that lacks substantive metaphysical commitments. The limitations of his approach are used to draw some more general lessons about the nonrepresentational artefacts of formal representations. Three key conclusions are drawn. (1) Stalnaker’s account of possible worlds semantics’ nonrepresentational artefacts does not cohere with his modal metaphysics. (2) Invariancebased analyses of nonrepresentational artefacts cannot capture a certain kind of artefact. (3) Stalnaker must treat instrumentally those aspects of possible worlds formalism governing the interaction between quantification and modality, under any analysis whatsoever of nonrepresentational artefacts.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
Notes
Assumption: what’s possibly necessary is actual; \(\Diamond \Box A \rightarrow @A\).
I am careful about use/mention only when necessary to avoid misunderstanding. ‘\(A\)’ and ‘\(B\)’ are usually metalinguistic variables ranging over sentences, though I sometimes use them schematically. Formal expressions are usually, but not always, mentioned.
Both sections draw on and elaborate (Stalnaker 2012, chs1–2).
(Stalnaker 2012, pp. 42–43) endorses this thesis, arguing that it’s required by the actualist thesis that actuality exhausts reality.
I extract commitment to NSW from (Stalnaker 2012, pp. 13–20, 28).
A singular witness for an existential proposition (or fact) of the form something is such that...is a singular proposition (or fact) of the corresponding form \(x\) is such that.... An individual \(x\) is a witness for the existential iff \(x\) is such that.... (Complete the dots in the same way each time.)
Recall that mere possibilia are simply actual individuals that occupy a certain formal semantic role: they’re elements of one of a model’s pointdomains not in its privileged pointdomain. They are not merely possible objects.
I use facttalk in a lightweight sense: for there to exist a fact that \(p\) just is for it to be that \(p\). An ontology of facts is not what’s at issue. Facttalk is merely an expository convenience.
This application draws heavily on (Williamson 2013, 189–190).
A variant approach employs a separate assignment of qualitative characters to intensions, independently of any language and valuation.
Alternatively: \(I\) represents a qualitative character related to those represented by other intensions in the appropriate way.
Because our object language lacks constant terms, elements of the privileged domain cannot receive representational import from the object language directly, as intensions do.
Better: the existence of mere possibilia and elements of \(D(w_@)\) standing in a certain network of relations to one another should be invariant under \(\approx\).
Although models with a single mere possibilium are problematic, they threaten only the letter of the view, rather than its spirit. Employing the actualityfixing isomorphisms of (Williamson 2013, note 49 on p192) in place of \(\sigma\)functions in the definition of \(\approx\) would resolve the problem. Actualityfixing isomorphisms are like \(\sigma\)functions, except allowing the sets of mere possibilia and points to vary (with fixed cardinality).
Williamson’s primary concern here lies not with \((\exists \hbox {con})\) but with the Barcan Formula \(\Diamond \exists x A \rightarrow \exists x \Diamond A\). The issues are closely connected. Every countermodel to the Barcan Formula satisfies \((\exists \hbox {con})\). And every model that satisfies \((\exists \hbox {con})\) is either a countermodel to the Barcan Formula, or differs from one only over the valuation function.
Objection: \(o\) is a mere possibilium of all models bearing \(\approx\) to \(m\); so that’s representational on Stalnaker’s approach; so \(m\)’s representational content isn’t silent about \(o\). Response: modify the definition of \(\approx\) by replacing \(\sigma\)functions with actualityfixing isomorphisms. See note 14.
Thanks to a referee for bringing this to my attention.
For details, see (Williamson 2013, Sect. 7 of ch5). Williamson’s semantics interprets objectlanguage quantifiers as having the same (unrestricted higherorder analogue of a) domain at each point. This needs complicating to accommodate the proposal in the text. Each point needs associating with a higherorder analogue of a domain, and the pointrelative satisfactionconditions—captured using Williamson’s predicate ‘TRUE’—for quantified sentences restricting accordingly. I won’t go into details here.
The assumption is reasonable given reality’s infinitude.
Example: sentences featuring empty names plausibly lack truthconditions. On this approach, the variant model lacks accuracy conditions, unlike the original model \(m\).
Objection: the set of mere possibilia is invariant under actualityfixing permutations of the outer domain; so the membership of that set should be representational; so models represent modal reality as fixing which nonactual things there could be, leaving it open which qualitative roles they could occupy. Reply: liberalise Stalnaker’s definition of \(\approx\) by employing actualityfixing isomorphisms in place of \(\sigma\)functions, as suggested in note 14. Note that the argument in the text survives this modification.
The example is inspired by a similar one in Cook (2002).
Certain forms of representational redundancy, or overdetermination of content, may even allow representors to vary between representationally equivalent models. I won’t examine that here.
More cautiously: the nature and intrinsic structure of that truthcondition aren’t represented; only its relationships to other truthconditions are represented.
Rejection of the Barcan Formula \(\Diamond \exists x A \rightarrow \exists x \Diamond A\) is also required. Defenders of \((\exists \hbox {con})\) must reject the Barcan Formula anyway; otherwise \((\exists \hbox {con})\) entails the actually inconsistent: \(\exists x \Diamond @ \forall y (x \ne y)\). Note 15 outlines the intimate modeltheoretic connection between \((\exists \hbox {con})\) and the Barcan Formula.
References
Cook, R. T. (2002). Vagueness and mathematical precision. Mind, 111, 225–247.
Krantz, D. H., Luce, R. D., Suppes, P., & Tversky, A. (1971). Foundations of measurement volume 1: Additive and polynomial representations. New York: Academic Press.
Stalnaker, R. (1994). The interaction of quantification with modality and identity. In W. Sinnott Armostrong & N. A. D. Raffman (Eds.), Modality, Morality and Belief: Essays in honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Reprinted with a Postscript in (Stalnaker, 2003, ch8)).
Stalnaker, R. (2003). Ways a world might be: Metaphysical and antimetaphysical essays. OUP.
Stalnaker, R. (2010). Merely possible propositions. In B. Hale & A. Hoffman (Eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, logic, and epistemology (pp. 21–33). (OUP. chap 1).
Stalnaker, R. (2012). Mere possibilities: Metaphysical foundations of modal semantics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Suppes, P. (2002). Representation and invariance. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Williamson, T. (2013). Modal logic as metaphysics. OUP.
Acknowledgments
For comments and discussion, I’m grateful to Justin ClarkeDoane, Billy Dunaway, Peter Fritz, Anil Gomes, Bob Hale, Rory Madden, Ian Phillips, Scott Sturgeon, Lee Walters, and Al Wilson. Thanks also to an audience in Nottingham, and the members of the HossackTextor WiP group. I’m especially grateful to Bob Stalnaker, for detailed and instructive written comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix: A fully realistic semantics?
Appendix: A fully realistic semantics?
An appendix to Mere Possibilities presents a variant semantics. Stalnaker describes it thus:
It is technically feasible to do the compositional semantics in a way that mixes reference to real things with artefacts of the model and then use the equivalence relations to filter out the artifacts at the end, but one might hope to do the semantics more directly, where all the values of a complex expression...are entities that exist in the actual world. Our Tarskian semantics makes reference to infinite sequences of possible individuals, sequences that may include “merely possible individuals” that are artifacts of the model. But this was just a notational convenience. Using the methods sketched in appendix B, we could do the compositional semantics directly, where all intermediate values in the composition are actual things. (Stalnaker 2012, pp. 124–125)
However, the semantics described in appendix B addresses not the problems above, but a slightly different issue. To avoid confusion, I now explain what Stalnaker’s appendix B does and doesn’t address.
The semantic theories of appendix B and Sect. 3 differ in two relatively trivial ways.
First way. Stalnaker does not relativise satisfaction to variable assignments. Assignments are needed to handle quantification. So Stalnaker takes an alternative approach to quantification. Rather than quantifying over assignments, he quantifies over extensions of the valuation function to new constant terms. The new clause for \(\exists\) is:

\(m, w \,\Vdash\, \exists v A\) iff, for some \(d \in D(w) : m^{[d/a]}, w \,\Vdash\, A^{[a/v]}\).
\(a\) is a new constant, not present in the original language. \(A^{[a/v]}\) is the sentence obtained by substituting \(a\) for all occurrences of \(v\) bound by the initial quantifier in \(\exists v A\). \(m^{[d/a]}\) is a model just like \(m\), except for its valuation \(V^{[d/a]}\). \(V^{[d/a]}\) is just like \(m\)’s valuation \(V\), except that \(V^{[d/a]}(a)=d\). The resulting satisfactioncondition for, say, \(\Diamond \exists x A\) involves quantification over all elements of the outer domain and consideration of all the associated extensions of the valuation function. So this is almost a notational variant of the assignmentbased approach in Sect. 3. The only real difference is that Stalnaker’s assignments are defined only for variables appearing in the sentence, rather than for all variables in the language. That could be mimicked with partially defined assignments.
Second way. Stalnaker’s valuations of constant terms are pointrelative. For a constant term \(a\), \(V_w(a)\) is the same object \(d\) at every point \(w\) whose domain contains \(d\), and undefined otherwise. We can mimic this with pointrelative assignments subject to the same constraint. For example, the new clause for atomic predication is:

\(m, w, \alpha \,\Vdash\, \varPhi v_{1},\ldots ,v_{n}\) iff \(\langle \alpha _w(v_1), \ldots , \alpha _w(v_n) \rangle \in V(\varPhi )(w)\).
What are the gains of this approach? Think of the semantic value of an open sentence (of one free variable) as a function that takes, at a world \(u\), each individual \(x\) to a singular proposition about \(x\). This function should be defined at \(u\) only for individuals that exist at \(u\): since there are no other individuals at \(u\), there are no other arguments to consider at \(u\), and no singular propositions about them to return as value. Functions defined on objects that don’t exist at \(u\) themselves don’t exist at \(u\). Treating assignments as insensitive to worlds forces the (formal representatives of) semantic values of open sentences to be defined relative to whatever there could possibly be (since they’re defined relative to all mere possibilia). We can avoid this by using world/pointrelativised assignments subject to the same constraint as Stalnaker places on valuations: \(\alpha _w(v)\) is the same object \(d\) at every point \(w\) whose domain contains \(d\), and undefined otherwise.
The quote above contrasts Stalnaker’s semantics with one that uses infinite sequences to determine assignments. On that approach, the semantic value of an open sentence at a world is defined relative to all such sequences. So it’s defined at some worlds relative to sequences containing things that don’t exist at that world. Interpreting this realistically will result in inaccuracy. Stalnaker’s focus on valuations for extensions of the language by a single constant, together with his worldrelativisation of valuations, avoids this (Stalnaker 2012, pp. 143–147). The semantic theory in Sect. 3 does not involve infinite sequences; it quantifies over variable assignments directly. Employing partially defined, pointrelative assignments as just described allows us to mimic Stalnaker’s approach, thereby avoiding the problems arising from satisfaction by infinite sequences.
None of this bears on the issues discussed above. The satisfactioncondition for \(\Diamond \exists x A\) still requires a witness for the satisfactioncondition of \(A\). Since its truthcondition doesn’t require a witness for the truthcondition of \(A\), the mismatch between satisfactionconditions and truthconditions remains. Stalnaker’s appendix B does not resolve and (as I read Stalnaker) is not intended to resolve, the problems with existential contingency that I have been discussing.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Jones, N.K. The representational limits of possible worlds semantics. Philos Stud 173, 479–503 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s1109801505034
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s1109801505034
Keywords
 Stalnaker
 Contingent existence
 Possible worlds semantics
 Invariance
 Artefacts