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On the particularity of experience

Philosophical Studies volume 173, pages 451–460 (2016)Cite this article

Abstract

Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full resources that naïve realism has to offer in explaining phenomenal character.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Trinity College, Oxford, OX1 3BH, UK

    Anil Gomes

  2. Trinity Hall, Cambridge, UK

    Craig French

Authors
  1. Anil Gomes
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  2. Craig French
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Correspondence to Craig French.

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Gomes, A., French, C. On the particularity of experience. Philos Stud 173, 451–460 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0501-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0501-6

Keywords

  • Perception
  • Particularity of perception
  • Naïve realism
  • Relationalism
  • Experience
  • Phenomenal Character