Skip to main content

Perceptual content and the content of mental imagery

Philosophical Studies volume 172, pages 1723–1736 (2015)Cite this article

Red, as seen by the mind and not the eye, exercises at once a definite and an indefinite impression on the soul. (Wassily Kandinsky, 1910)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these two different mental states. And this puts important constraints on how we should think about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Access options

Buy single article

Instant access to the full article PDF.

USD 39.95

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Notes

  1. See also Smith (2006, footnote 18) “We imagine a tiger by imagining seeing it. It does not follow that because we are imagining an experience we fail to imagine the object of the experience. Given this, there is every reason to think that seeing an F and imagining seeing an F will be phenomenologically similar”.

  2. There are interesting implications of this parallel between the exercise of perceptual attention and of attention in the case of mental imagery. Perceptual attention is often described as some kind of selection: selection from informational overload, selection for action etc. This way of talking about attention seems fitting for perceptual attention. But it is much more difficult to make sense of the selection metaphor in the case of attending to mental imagery as it is not at all clear what is supposed to be selected (given that there is no sensory stimulation). I can’t pursue the implications of this asymmetry here, but one possible way of addressing it would be to give up on the selection metaphor of attention altogether (even in the case of perceptual attention).

References

  • Altmann, G. T. M. (2004). Language-mediated eye movements in the absence of a visual world: The ‘blank screen paradigm’. Cognition, 93, 79–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bach, K. (1978). A representational theory of action. Philosophical Studies, 34, 361–379.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bálint, R. (1909/1995). Seelenlahmung des ‘Schauens’, optische Ataxie, raumliche Storung der Aufmerksamkeit. Monatsschrift fur Psychiatrie und Neurologie, 25, 51–81. (English translation: Cognitive Neuropsychology 12, 265–281).

  • Batty, C. (2010). Scents and sensibilia. American Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 103–118.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bensafi, M., et al. (2003). Olfactomotor activity during imagery mimics that during perception. Nature Neuroscience, 6, 1142–1144.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berryhill, M. E., Phuong, L., Picasso, L., Cabeza, R., & Olson, I. R. (2007). Parietal lobe and episodic memory: Bilateral damage causes impaired free recall of autobiographical memory. Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 14415–14423.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Block, N. (1995). A confusion about consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 227–247.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brandt, S. A., & Stark, L. W. (1997). Spontaneous eye movements during visual imagery reflect the content of the visual scene. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9, 27–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Briscoe, R. (2011). Mental imagery and the varieties of amodal perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92, 153–173.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (2010). The origins of objectivity. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, P., Becker, S., & Burgess, N. (2007). Remembering the past and imagining the future: A neural model of spatial memory and imagery. Psychological Review, 114, 340–375.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 187–192.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cheeny, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990). How monkeys see the world. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark, A. (2000). A theory of sentience. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, A. (2004). Sensing, objects, and awareness: Reply to commentators. Philosophical Psychology, 17, 563–589.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark, A. (2011). Vicissitudes of non-visual objects. Philosophical Studies, 153, 175–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, J. (2004). Objects, places, and perception. Philosophical Psychology, 17, 471–495.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crane, T. (2009). Is perception a propositional attitude? Philosophical Quarterly, 59, 452–469.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Currie, G. (1995). Visual imagery as the simulation of vision. Mind and Language, 10, 25–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Currie, G., & Ian, R. (2002). Recreative minds: Imagination in philosophy and psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1996). Seeing is believing: Or is it? In K. Akins (Ed.), Perception (pp. 158–172). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Findlay, J M., & Gilchrist, I. D. (2003). Active vision: The psychology of looking and seeing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Funkhouser, E. (2006). The determinable–determinate relation. Nous, 40, 548–569.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gibson, J. J. (1966). The senses considered as perceptul systems. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibson, J. J. (1979). An ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gregory, D. (2010). Imagery, the imagination and experience. Philosophical Quarterly, 60, 735–753.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heckenmueller, E. G. (1965). Stabilization of the retinal image: A review of method, effects and theory. Psychological Bulletin, 63, 157–169.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hill, C. (1991). Sensations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hopkins, R. (2012). What Perky did not show. Analysis, 72, 431–439.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Humphreys, G. W., & Riddoch, M. J. (2001). Detection by action: Neuropsychological evidence for action-defined templates in search. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 84–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ishiguro, H. (1967). Imagination. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 41, 37–56.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jacob, P. J., & Jeannerod, M. (2003). Ways of seeing. The scope and limits of visual cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jeannerod, M. (1988). The neural and behavioral organization of goal-directed movements. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jeannerod, M. (1994). The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 187–245.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jeannerod, M. (1997). The cognitive neuroscience of action. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johansson, R., Holsanova, J., & Holmqvist, K. (2006). Pictures and spoken descriptions elicit similar eye movements during mental imagery, both in light and in complete darkness. Cognitive Science, 30, 1053–1079.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnston, W. E. (1921). Logic. Part I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelly, S. (2010). The normative nature of perceptual experience. In B. Nanay (Ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kind, A. (2001). Putting the image back to imagination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, 85–109.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kleiman, L. (1978). Mental images: Another look. Philosophical Studies, 34, 169–176.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kosslyn, S. M. (1980). Image and mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W. L., & Ganis, G. (2006). The case for mental imagery. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W. L., Kim, I. J., & Alpert, N. M. (1995). Topographical representations of mental images in primary visual cortex. Nature, 378, 496–498.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kriegel, U. (2007). The phenomenologically manifest. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6,115–136.

  • Laeng, B., Bloem, I. M., D’Ascenzo, S., & Tommasi, L. (2014). Scrutinizing visual images: The role of gaze in mental imageyr and memory. Cognition, 131, 263–283.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laeng, B., & Teodorescu, D.-S. (2002). Eye scanpaths during visual imagery re-enact those of perception of the same visual scene. Cognitive Science, 26, 207–231.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W. (2000). The slighting of smell. In N. Bhushan & S. Rosenfeld (Eds.), Of minds and molecules: New philosophical perspectives on chemistry (pp. 273–289). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mack, A., & Rock, I. (1998). Inattentional blindness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, M. G. F. (2002). The transparency of experience. Mind and Language, 17, 376–425.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mast, F. W., & Kosslyn, S. M. (2002). Eye movements during visual mental imagery. Trends in Cognitive Science, 6, 271–272.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Matthen, M. (2004). Features, places and things. Philosophical Psychology, 17, 497–519.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Matthen, M. (2010). How things look (and what things look that way). In B. Nanay (Ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matthews, G. B. (1969). Mental copies. Philosophical Studies, 78, 53–73.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (2009). Imagining, recognizing and discriminating. Reconsidering the ability hypothesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79, 699–717.

  • Nanay, B. (2010a). Attention and perceptual content. Analysis, 70, 263–270.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (2010b). Perception and imagination: Amodal perception as mental imagery. Philosophical Studies, 150, 239–254.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (2011a). Do we see apples as edible? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92, 305–322.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (2011b). Do we sense modalities with our sense modalities? Ratio, 24, 299–310.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (2011c). Ambiguous figures, attention and perceptual content. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 10, 557–561.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (2012a). Action-oriented perception. European Journal of Philosophy, 20, 430–446.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (2012b). The philosophical implications of the Perky experiments. Analysis, 72, 439–443.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (2012c). Perceiving tropes. Erkenntnis, 77, 1–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (2013). Between perception and action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (2012d). Perceptual phenomenology. Philosophical Perspectives, 26, 235–246.

  • Neiworth, J. J. (1992). Cognitive aspects of movement estimation: A test of imagery in animals. In K. W. Honig & J. G. Fetterman (Eds.), Cognitive aspects of stimulus control (pp. 323–346). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noordhof, P. (2002). Imagining objects and imagining experiences. Mind and Language, 17, 426–455.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Callaghan, C. (2007). Sounds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Oakley, D. A. (1985). Cognition and imagery in animals. In D. A. Oakley (Ed.), Brain and Mind (pp. 99–131). London: Methuen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Page, J. W., Duhamel, P., & Crognale, M. A. (2011). ERP evidence of visualization at early stages of visual processing. Brain and Cognition, 75(2), 141–146.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peacocke, C. (1985). Imagination, experience, and possibility: A Berkeley-an view defended. In J. Foster & H. Robinson (Eds.), Essays on Berkeley. (pp. 19–35). Oxford: Clarendon.

  • Peacocke, C. (1992). A study of concepts. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Penn, D. C., & Povinelli, D. J. (2007). On the lack of evidence that non-human animals possess anything remotely resembling a ‘theory of mind’. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 362, 731–744.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Perky, C. W. (1910). An experimental study of imagination. American Journal of Psychology, 21, 422–452.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of attention. Quaterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 2–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner, M. I. (1984). Current research in the study of selective attention. In E. Donchin (Ed.), Cognitive psychophysiology: Event related potentials and the study of cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner, M. I., Walker, J. A., Friedrich, F. J., & Rafal, R. D. (1984). Effects of parietal injury on covert orienting of attention. Journal of Neuroscience, 4, 1863–1874.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J. (2010). How do perceptual states become conscious? In B. Nanay (Ed.), Perceiving the world. New essays on perception. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2007). Things and places: How the mind connects with the world. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Richardson, A. (1969). Mental imagery. New York: Springer Publishing Company Inc.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Riddoch, M. J., Edwards, M. G., & Humphreys, G. W. (1998). Visual affordances direct action: Neuropsychological evidence from manual interference. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 15, 645–693.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rilling, M. E., & Neiworth, J. J. (1987). Theoretical and methodological considerations for the study of imagery in animals. Learning and Motivation, 18, 57–79.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Huchinson.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schellenberg, S. (2013). Belief and desire in imagination and immersion. Journal of Philosophy, 110, 497–517.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scholl, B. J., & Tremoulet, P. D. (2000). Perceptual causality and animacy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 299–309.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Segal, S. J. (1972). Assimilation of a stimulus in the construction of an image: The Perky effect revisited. In W. P. Sheehan (Ed.), The function and nature of imagery (pp. 203–230). New York: Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Segal, S. J., & Nathan, S. (1964). The Perky effect: Incorporation of an external stimulus into an imagery experience under placebo and control conditions. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 19, 385–395.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shorter, J. M. (1952). Imagination. Mind, 61, 528–542.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Siegel, S. (2005). The phenomenology of efficacy. Philosophical Topics, 33, 65–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Siegel, S. (2006). Which properties are represented in perception? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual experience (pp. 481–503). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Siegel, S. (2009). The visual experience of causation. Philosophical Quarterly, 59, 519–540.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simons, D. J., & Chabris, C. F. (1999). Gorillas in our midst: Sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events. Perception, 28, 1059–1074.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, J. (2006). Bodily awareness, imagination and the self. European Journal of Philosophy, 14, 49–68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spivey, M., & Geng, J. (2001). Oculomotor mechanisms activated by imagery and memory: Eye movements to absent objects. Psychological Research, 65, 235–241.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stazicker, J. (2011). Attention, visual consciousness and indeterminacy. Mind and Language, 26, 156–184.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tomasello, M., Call, J., & Hare, B. (2003). Chimpanzees understand psychological states—The question is which ones and to what extent. Trends in Cognitive Science, 7, 153–156.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Trehub, A. (1991). The cognitive brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Leeuwen, N. (2011). Imagination is where the action is. Journal of Philosophy, 108, 55–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolfe, J. M. (1999). Inattentional amnesia. In V. Coltheart (Ed.), Fleeting memories. Cognition of brief visual stimuli (pp. 71–94). Cambidge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yeshurun, Y., & Carrasco, M. (1998). Attention improves or impairs visual performance by enhancing spatial resolution. Nature, 396, 72–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the EU FP7 CIG grant PCIG09-GA-2011-293818 and the FWO Odysseus grant G.0020.12N. I presented this paper at the Fourth Online Consciousness Conference and I am grateful for the comments I received there. I am also grateful for comments by Neil Van Leeuwen, Jake Berger and an anonymous referee for this Journal on an earlier draft.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium

    Bence Nanay

  2. Peterhouse, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

    Bence Nanay

Authors
  1. Bence Nanay
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Bence Nanay.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Nanay, B. Perceptual content and the content of mental imagery. Philos Stud 172, 1723–1736 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0392-y

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0392-y

Keywords

  • Perceptual content
  • Mental imagery
  • Attention
  • Determinacy
  • Determinable/determinate properties
  • Dependency Thesis