Philosophical Studies

, Volume 172, Issue 3, pp 563–585 | Cite as

Perception and observation unladened

Article

Abstract

Let us call ‘veridicalism’ the view that perceptual beliefs and observational reports are largely truthful. This paper aims to make a case for veridicalism by, among other things, examining in detail and ultimately deflating in import what many consider to be the view’s greatest threat, the so-called ‘theory-ladenness’ of perception and/or observation. In what follows, it is argued that to the extent that theoretical factors influence the formation of perceptual beliefs and observational reports, as theory-ladenness demands, that influence is typically not detrimental to their veridicality or at least not irreversibly so. Central to the defence of veridicalism are two principles: that of internal similarities and that of internal dissimilarities.

Keywords

Theory-laden Perception Observation Evidence 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Duesseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of DuesseldorfDüsseldorfGermany

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