Philosophical Studies

, Volume 171, Issue 3, pp 517–533 | Cite as

Centrality and marginalisation

  • Brian Weatherson

Welcome to the history of late analytic philosophy

It’s a good time to be doing history of late analytic philosophy. There is flurry of new and exciting work on how philosophy got from the death pangs of positivism and ordinary language philosophy to where it is today. Some may see this as a much needed gap in the literature. Indeed, there are a couple of reasons for scepticism about there being such a field as history of late analytic philosophy, both of which are plausible but wrong.

One reason is that it is too recent. But it is not be too recent for general historical study; there are courses in history departments on September 11, so it’s not like looking at philosophy from 30 to 40 years ago is rushing in where historians fear to tread. And indeed, if logical positivism could be treated historically in the 1960s, and ordinary language philosophy could be treated historically at the turn of the century, it seems a reasonable time to look back at the important works of the 1970s...


Thought Experiment Implicit Knowledge Characteristic Error Philosophy Department Gettier Case 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Michigan - Ann ArborAnn ArborUSA
  2. 2.ArchéUniversity of St AndrewsSt AndrewsScotland

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